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of labour, as illustrated in section 5. An additional remark may further clarify the informational
structure of the model. The optimal tax formulas derived in the paper assume knowledge of wage
levels and elasticities, but only require anonymous information on the wage distribution at the
firm level. Such information is not sufficient, however, to implement optimal lump-sum taxation
since personalised lump-sum taxes can be levied only on the basis of the wage distribution at
the individual level.
3. Optimal linear taxation of labour
From (2.5) it is apparent that an increase in source-based taxes translates into an identical
increase in the producer interest rate, while leaving the consumer interest rate unaffected. As
a result, source-based taxes cannot redistribute income by exploiting differences in consumers’
saving behaviour as, for example in Haufler (1997) and Lopez et al. (1996). Nonetheless, the
change in the producer interest rate modifies the demand for labour and induces a variation
in equilibrium wage levels. Given constant returns to scale and no-joint production, the final
effect on wages can be retrieved from the equilibrium conditions in production. The zero profit
conditions for the two sectors are
c1(w1, r) = p1 (3.1)
c2
¡
w2, r
¢
= p2 (3.2)
where ci represents the unit cost function. In the absence of commodity taxes, producer prices,
pi, are equal to the given world price levels, so that equilibrium wages are functions of the
producer interest rate only. Implicit differentiation and application of Shephard’s lemma entail
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∂wi
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wi
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Li
≡ −γi (3.3)
where Ki and Li denote, respectively, the demand for capital and the demand for labour in
sector i. In other words, the burden of source-based taxation is shifted completely onto the
two immobile factors as an increase in the producer interest rate reduces wages in both sectors.
Furthermore, in each sector the wage reduction equals the capital-labour ratio, γi. As a result,
source-based taxes do not necessarily lead to a proportional fall in the wage level but they may
well modify the distribution of income between agents endowed with different types of labour.
The issue analysed in the rest of this section is whether the government can exploit the
differential incidence of a source-based tax to improve on the income distribution achieved with
linear taxes on labour income. I tackle the question in two steps. In the next subsection I
investigate whether the introduction of a source-based tax is welfare-improving given optimal
differential taxation of labour and optimal residence-based capital income taxes. This is rather
an artificial problem. If the government can directly observe the type of labour supplied by each
individual, the first best allocation can be implemented through personalised lump-sum transfers.
Nevertheless, the analysis of differential linear taxation of labour provides a useful benchmark
for interpreting the optimal tax formulas derived in subsection (3.2) under the assumption that
the government can observe directly neither wages nor the labour supply. Finally, in subsection
(3.3) I analyse the optimality of differential origin-based commodity taxation.
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3.1. Differential labour taxation
When each type of labour can be taxed at a different rate the optimal taxation problem faced
by the government is
max
t1L,t
2
L,tS ,b
W
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¡
ω1, b
¢
, (1− n)V
¡
ω2, b
¢¢
(3.4)
subject to
R+ b− t1Lnw1l1 − t2L (1− n)w2l2 − tS
¡
nγ1l1 + (1− n) γ2l2
¢
≤ 0 (3.5)
where R is an exogenous budget requirement, li is the individual supply of labour of type i.
Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, the first order conditions for b, t1L and t
2
L and tS
are respectively
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(3.9)
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where αi is the social marginal valuation of income accruing to consumers of type i measured
in terms of government revenue.1
Expression (3.9) shows that a marginal increase in the source-based tax produces three
different effects on welfare.
First, it reduces the net wage of skilled workers by an amount equal to
¡
1− t1L
¢
γ1. The
expression inside the curly brackets gives the social evaluation of this reduction. The first term
represents the direct effects on both the government budget constraint (l1) and the consumer’s
utility (−α1l1). The second term identifies the indirect effects on the government of changes in
the labour supply.
Second, it reduces the net wage of the unskilled by an amount equal to
¡
1− t2L
¢
γ2. As for
wage 1, the expression inside the curly brackets represents the direct and indirect effects on
social welfare.
Third, it raises the producer interest rate and brings about a variation in the domestic capital
stock equal to γ1rnl
1 + γ2r (1− n) l2. By taking the derivative of (3.3) one obtains
γir ≡ −
∂2wi
∂ (r)
2 =
cirrc
i
w − circiwr
(ciw)
2 −
cirwc
i
w − circiww
(ciw)
2 γ
i (3.10)
which shows that γir is always non-positive since c
i
rr and c
i
ww are non-positive whilst c
i
rw and
ciwr are non-negative numbers. Hence by increasing its source-based tax the country experiences
a capital outflow that decreases both revenue and welfare.
1 If λ denotes the the multiplier associated to the government budget constraint (i.e. the social marginal value
of revenue) αi is defined as follows:
αi ≡ ∂W
∂V i
∂V i
∂b
Á
λ.
Notice that condition (3.6) implies that the multiplier is different from zero.
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It is apparent that the first two effects of the source-based tax are proportional to the effects
produced by the two taxes on labour represented by the left hand sides of (3.7) and (3.8). When
t1L and t
2
L are set to their optimal values, these effects vanish. The impact of the source-based
tax on social welfare reduces to the revenue loss due to the capital outflow. In fact, substituting
(3.7) and (3.8) into (3.9) gives
tS
¡
γ1rnl
1 + γ2r (1− n) l2
¢
= 0. (3.11)
Equation (3.11) implies that the optimal source-based tax is equal to zero when γir 6= 0. There is
just one particular case where this condition is not met: when a Leontief technology is adopted
in both sectors. In this case (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) are linearly dependent and the optimal
source-based taxation is indeterminate. Summarizing,
Proposition 3.1. The optimal source-based tax is zero when each type of labour can be taxed
at a different rate.
This result is not just a corollary of Diamond and Mirrlees’ theorem on production efficiency
as commodity taxes are not set at their optimal level. The proposition is an extension of the
result obtained by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) in a framework with identical individuals.
In the next section I show that the optimal source-based tax is not zero if the government is
constrained to use a uniform tax on labour.
In order to interpret the formulas that are presented in the following, it is expedient to
elaborate the first order conditions (3.6)-(3.9). Let βi be the net social marginal valuation of
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income accruing to consumers of type i measured in terms of government revenue, i.e.:
βi ≡ αi +
¡
tiLw
i + tSγ
i
¢
lib.
It is net as it takes into account the taxes paid on a unit transfer to individual i due to the
income effects on the labour supply. Using Proposition 3.1, the Slutsky relationship and standard
algebraic manipulations,2 the first order conditions (3.6)-(3.9) give:
nβ1 + (1− n)β2 = 1 (3.12)
t1L
1− t1L
=
¡
1− β1
¢
εc1lw
(3.13)
t2L
1− t2L
=
¡
1− β2
¢
εc2lw
(3.14)
where εcilw is the elasticity of the compensated labour supply with respect to the wage. Condition
(3.12 ) states that the lump-sum transfer equates the average net social marginal utility of income
to 1. It implies that the two terms
¡
1− βi
¢
are either opposite in sign or both equal to 0. The
optimal tax rates on labour satisfy a standard inverse elasticity rule adjusted for distributional
considerations. When the government is indifferent with regard to the distribution of income,
that is α1 = α2 = 1 in competitive equilibrium with uniform lump-sum taxation, there is no
reason to resort to distortionary taxation. By contrast, if the government wishes to change the
distribution of income that arises in the competitive equilibrium, it levies a tax on the wage of
workers with the lower net social marginal valuation of income and pays a subsidy to workers
2See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1981) pp. 386-388.
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with the higher net social marginal valuation of income. The tax and subsidy rates decrease
with the elasticity of the labour supply on which they are levied or granted.
3.2. Uniform labour taxation
As previously remarked, problem (3.4) does not take account of the informational constraints
faced by the government in a consistent manner. Personalised lump-sum transfers are deemed
to be infeasible even if the government can directly observe the type of labour supplied by each
individual. In the rest of this paper I resolve this inconsistency by assuming that the government
cannot directly observe either the individual wage or the labour supply, but only labour income.3
Hence, differential labour taxation is infeasible and the government is left with two alternatives:
uniform linear taxation or non linear taxation of labour income. Uniform linear taxation is
considered first, while the analysis of non-linear income taxation is postponed to section 4.
When labour income is taxed at a uniform rate the optimal tax problem becomes
Max
tL,tS,b
W
¡
nV
¡
ω1, b
¢
, (1− n)V
¡
ω2, b
¢¢
(3.15)
subject to
R+ b− tL
¡
nw1l1 + (1− n)w2l2
¢
− tS
¡
γ1nl1 + γ2 (1− n) l2
¢
≤ 0 (3.16)
The first order conditions for b, tL and tS read respectively
3As remarked in section 2, in order to sustain the unfeasiblility of differential linear taxation when labour
is sector specific, one must further assume both that the government cannot observe the sector where each
individual works and that it cannot levy taxes on labour at the firm level.
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The first two effects of the source-based tax, produced by the change in the two net wages,
do not vanish although the labour tax has been set to its optimal level according to (3.18). In
fact, by substituting (3.18) into (3.19) and rearranging, one obtains
ε2wr − ε1wr
r
ω2 (1− n)
©¡
α2 − 1
¢
l2 +
£
tLw
2l2w + tSγ
2l2w
¤ª
+
tS
¡
γ1rnl
1 + γ2r (1− n) l2
¢
= 0. (3.20)
where εiwr represent both the elasticity of wage i with respect to the producer interest rate and
the ratio between total interest and wages paid in sector i.
The first term in equation (3.20) describes the effect on social welfare of the income redis-
tribution brought about by a marginal increase in the source-based tax. In order to interpret
this expression it is expedient to decompose the final change in equilibrium wages using the
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elasticities εiwr:
∂w1
∂r
Á
w1 =
ε1wr
r
(3.21)
∂w2
∂r
Á
w2 =
ε1wr
r
+
ε2wr − ε1wr
r
. (3.22)
The source-based tax reduces both wages by a percentage equal to ε1wr
±
r. Then it brings about
an additional variation in the wage of the unskilled that is equal to
¡¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
−
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯¢±
r as a
percentage of the initial level. This additional change may represent an increase if
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
<
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
or a further decrease if
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
<
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
. The proportional reduction in both wages does not affect
social welfare as the labour tax is at its optimal level. Hence the first term in (3.20) contains
exclusively the additional increase (decrease) in the wage of the unskilled that is measured by
the multiplicative factor outside the curly brackets. The expression inside the curly brackets
gives the social evaluation of such a change as explained when discussing (3.9).
As in (3.9), the second term in (3.20) represents the revenue loss due to capital outflow.
Expression (3.20) shows that source-based taxation is a substitute for differential labour
taxation. In fact, there are just two circumstances in which the (3.20) implies that the optimal
source-based tax is zero. The first is when the source-based tax produces the same proportional
reduction in both wages (i.e. ε2wr = ε
1
wr). In this case the source-based tax is Pareto dominated
by the uniform labour tax as the latter reduces wages but does not affect the return on the
domestic capital stock. The second is when differential labour taxation is not socially desirable.
In fact, the tax rates that solve problem (3.4) are also a solution of problem (3.15) if the optimal
rate on skilled labour is equal to the optimal rate on unskilled labour. In such case each single
term in (3.18) is equal to zero and (3.20) reduces to (3.11). Further, a solution of problem (3.15)
solves the first order conditions of problem (3.4) when the expression in curly brackets in (3.20)
18
is equal to zero. However, the analysis presented at the end of the last section has shown that
uniform labour taxation cannot be a solution of the optimal taxation problem, except where the
government, in the absence of distributional objectives, finances its expenditure with a poll-tax.
Summarizing,
Proposition 3.2. When α1 6= α2 in competitive equilibrium with uniform lump-sum taxation
and the government can implement an optimal linear tax on labour income, the optimal source-
based tax is different from zero if and only if ε2wr 6= ε1wr.
It is useful to compare the results presented up to this point with the conclusions reached by
Gerber and Hewitt (1987). They argue that for a small open economy it may be expedient to
grant a source-based capital subsidy but never desirable to resort to source-based taxes. These
results are based on two crucial assumptions. The first is that the government cannot directly
transfer income to workers either through subsidies to labour or through a uniform lump-sum
grant even though it can levy taxes at different rates on skilled and unskilled labour. The second
is that the wages of skilled workers are proportional to the wages of the unskilled.
The first assumption is needed to avoid the outcome of Proposition 3.1: if the government can
levy positive as well negative differential taxes on labour there is no reason to resort to source-
based capital taxes or subsidies. The second assumption, is responsible for the inefficiency
of a source-based capital tax. When wages are proportional to each other, ε2wr = ε
1
wr: a
source-based tax does not redistribute labour income but uniformly reduces the wage level.
The same outcome can be achieved with labour taxes, while avoiding the revenue loss due to
capital flight. By contrast, a source-based capital subsidy turns out to be efficient because it
is the only instrument that allows income to be transferred from the skilled to the unskilled.
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The government can grant a source-based subsidy on capital and finance it with a tax on skilled
labour. The source-based subsidy raises both wages but only the unskilled enjoy a higher income
as the labour tax more than compensates for the increase in the wage of the skilled.
By allowing for differential incidence the model analysed in this paper provides a rationale for
source-based subsidies to capital that does not depend on ad hoc restrictions on labour income
taxation. Furthermore, expression (3.20) suggests that even a positive source-based tax can be
efficient, depending on the elasticities εiwr and the social evaluation of an increase in the wage of
the unskilled. For example, when a marginal increase in the net wage of the unskilled is socially
desirable (i.e. the expression in curly brackets in (3.20) is positive), the optimal source-based
tax is positive when the burden is shifted onto the wage of the skilled more than proportionally
(i.e.
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
>
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
). This conclusion can be strengthened by solving condition (3.18) for tL and
substituting into (3.19). Tedious but straightforward manipulations yield:
tS =
¡
ε2wr − ε1wr
¢
(1− n)ω2l2
£
εc2lw
¡
1− β1
¢
− εc1lw
¡
1− β2
¢¤
nw1l1
∆
(3.23)
where ∆ denotes an expression which is always positive4. As explained in the previous section
condition (3.17) implies that the two terms
¡
1− βi
¢
are opposite in sign when the government
has redistributional objectives. Hence the expression in the square bracket in (3.23) is positive
when the government wants to redistribute income towards the unskilled, that is when β2 > β1,
while it is negative when the government aims to transfer income from the unskilled to the
4 It is
∆ ≡
µ
ε2wr
r −
ε1wr
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¶2
nl1w1ε1lw (1− n) l2w2ε2lw
−
¡
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γ1rnl1 + γ2r (1− n) l2
¢
.
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skilled, that is when β2 < β1. This leads immediately to the following result:
Proposition 3.3. Under an optimal linear tax on labour income,
sgn (tS) = sgn
¡¡
ε2wr − ε1wr
¢× ¡β2 − β1¢¢ . (3.24)
We can conclude that the government of a small open economy levies a positive source-based
tax on capital income if a higher proportion of the tax burden is shifted onto the class of workers
with the lower net social marginal utility of income.
3.3. Optimal origin-based taxes
The conclusions drawn for source-based taxation can be easily applied to uniform origin-based
taxation. If world prices are given, origin-based taxes are shifted completely onto the immobile
factors and a uniform ad valorem origin-based commodity tax can exactly replicate a source-
based tax on capital income5.
The preceding analysis does not answer the question whether the government should levy
differential origin-based commodity taxes. Such taxation provides an additional tool for redis-
5To see this point, assume that t∗L and t∗S are optimal tax rates. Taxes t0L ≡
¡
1− t∗L
¢ ³
1 +
t∗S
r∗
´
−1, t0S = 0 and
a uniform origin-based ad valorem tax τ 0O ≡
t∗S
r∗
.³
1 +
t∗S
r∗
´
are consistent with the original consumer equilibrium
prices and satisfy the zero profit conditions
c1( ω
1
(1−t∗L)
, r∗ − t∗S) = p∗1 ⇔ c1(
ω1
(1−t∗L)
µ
1+
t∗S
r∗
¶ , r∗) = p∗1µ
1+
t∗S
r∗
¶ = p∗1 ¡1− τ 0O¢
c2( ω
2
(1−t∗L)
, r∗ − t∗S) = p∗2 ⇔ c2(
ω2
(1−t∗L)
µ
1+
t∗S
r∗
¶ , r∗) = p∗2µ
1+
t∗S
r∗
¶ = p∗2 ¡1− τ 0O¢
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tribution. The no-profit conditions
c1(w1, r∗) = p1∗ − t1O (3.25)
c2
¡
w2, r∗
¢
= p2∗ − t2O (3.26)
show that gross wages can be independently manipulated through t1O and t
2
O. However, it is not
apparent whether it is desirable to resort to this additional instrument since uniform origin-based
commodity taxation and a linear labour income tax are sufficient to control the distribution of
the two net wages.
The question can be resolved by analyzing the government maximisation problem
Max
tL,tS ,tO,b
W
¡
nV
¡
ω1, b
¢
, (1− n)V
¡
ω2, b
¢¢
(3.27)
subject to
R+ b− tL
¡
nw1l1 + (1− n)w2l2
¢
− t1Oθ1nl1 − t2Oθ2 (1− n) l2 ≤ 0 (3.28)
where
θi ≡ ∂w
i
∂pi
=
1
ci
wi
=
Xi
Li
(3.29)
and Xi is domestic production of the good i. As for source-based taxes, origin-based taxes do
not enter directly into social welfare as they do not affect commodity consumer prices.
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The first order conditions for tL, t1O and t
2
O read respectively
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¤ª
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Conditions (3.31) and (3.32) state that the optimal commodity tax rates must balance the
marginal variation in welfare due to income redistribution with the variation in revenues due
to the change in domestic production. An increase in the origin-based tax in sector i, leads
both to a decrease in the net wage of labour of type i, equal to (1− tL) θ2, and to a decrease in
per-capita production in the same sector, equal to −θipli, as the derivative of (3.29) with respect
to pi,
θip = −
ciww
(ciw)
2 θ
is always positive since ciww < 0.
The comparison of condition (3.20) with conditions (3.31) and (3.32) suggests that the main
difference between uniform and differential origin-based commodity taxation lies in their inci-
dence on wages. Given that the two types of labour are sector specific, differential commodity
taxation always allows one wage to be reduced with respect to the other, while the same objec-
tive can be achieved with uniform taxation only if ε1wr 6= ε2wr. As a result, optimal origin-based
commodity taxes are always different from zero when the expressions in curly brackets in (3.31)
and (3.32) do not vanish, that is, when the net social marginal utility of income is different for
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skilled and unskilled workers. Summarising,
Proposition 3.4. When α1 6= α2 in competitive equilibrium with uniform lump-sum taxation
and the government can implement an optimal linear tax on labour income, optimal origin-based
commodity taxes are different from zero.
A closer look at expressions (3.31) and (3.32) clarifies the rationale of differential origin-based
commodity taxation. By substituting condition (3.30) into (3.31) and rearranging one obtains
(1− tL) θ1
w2 (1− n)
w1n
©¡
α2 − 1
¢
l2 +
£
tLw
2l2w + tOθ
2l2w
¤ª
− t1Oθ1pl1 = 0. (3.33)
This expression shows that with an optimal linear income tax the redistribution of income
brought about by the tax on good 1 has an effect on welfare that is proportional to the effect
due to the redistribution of income produced by the tax on good 2. Why should the govern-
ment resort to both taxes? The reason is that by mixing the two tax instruments the govern-
ment reduces the revenue losses brought about by the redistribution of income. In order to
achieve a unit increase in the net wage of the unskilled, the government has two options. The
first, described by condition (3.32), is to reduce (increase) the tax (subsidy) on good 2 by an
amount equal to
£
(1− tL) θ2
¤−1
. As previously explained, this causes a revenue loss equal to¯¯¯£
(1− tL) θ2
¤−1
t2Oθ
2
pl
2
¯¯¯
. The second, represented by condition (3.33), is to increase (reduce) the
tax (subsidy) on good 1 by an amount equal to
£
(1− tL) θ1
¤−1 ¡
w1n
±
w2 (1− n)
¢
. This in turn,
reduces revenue by
¯¯¯£
(1− tL) θ1
¤−1 ¡
w1n
±
w2 (1− n)
¢
t1Oθ
1
pl
1
¯¯¯
. The desired increase in wage 2
is achieved efficiently when the marginal costs of the two tax instruments are equalised, that is,
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by substituting (3.32) into (3.33), when the following condition is satisfied
t2Oθ
2
pl
2
(1− tL) θ2
= −
t1Oθ
1
pl
1
(1− tL) θ1
w1n
w2 (1− n) . (3.34)
Using the fact that
piθi = wi + rγi (3.35)
and rearranging, condition (3.34) can be rewritten as,
τ1O
τ2O
= −(1− n)w
2l2
nw1l1
η2lw
η1lw
¡
1 +
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯¢
(1 + |ε1wr|)
(3.36)
where τ iO denotes the ad -valorem tax rate on good i and η
i
lw the elasticity of labour demand
with respect to the wage. The striking feature of this expression is that the optimal ratio
between the two commodity tax rates does not depend on the value judgements embedded in
the social welfare functional. This is because the two taxes can achieve the same results in terms
of income redistribution when coupled with a linear income tax. Another important implication
of condition (3.36) is that the optimal tax rates have opposite signs. Hence, uniform ad -valorem
commodity taxation cannot be a solution of the optimal taxation problem, apart from the trivial
case where a government with no distributional objectives finances its expenditure exclusively
through a uniform lump-sum tax. As to the level of the tax rates, condition (3.36) provides an
inverse elasticity rule: the tax (subsidy) rate on good i decreases with total labour income, the
elasticity of labour demand and the elasticity of the wage with respect to the interest rate in
sector i.
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